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Abstract: This paper examines the potential benefits and costs of providing duty-free-quota-
free market access to the least-developed-countries (LDCs), and the effects of extending 
eligibility to other small and poor countries. Using the MIRAGE computable general equilibrium 
model, it assesses the impact of scenarios involving different levels of coverage for products, 
recipient countries, and preference-giving countries on participating countries, as well as 
competing developing countries that are excluded. The main goal of this paper is to highlight 
the role that rich and emerging countries could play in helping poor countries to improve their 
trade performance and to assess the distribution of costs and benefits for developing countries 
and whether the potential costs for domestic producers are in line with political feasibility in 
preference-giving countries. 
 
JEL Classifications: D58; F13; F17; 
Key Words: CGE modeling, trade policy, duty-free market access, technical barriers to trade, 
preference erosion. 
   Introduction 
The globalization surge of the past three decades mostly missed the poorest countries in the 
world.  While other developing countries were able to ride the wave, the share of today’s least 
developed countries (LDCs) in global exports fell by two-thirds from 1970 to 2000, twice as 
much as the fall in their share of global income.
1
The high-income members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and increasingly advanced developing countries as well, provide preferential market 
access for developing countries. But even the more generous programs for LDCs often contain 
exceptions and the exceptions are usually concentrated in a narrow range of products where 
LDCs have comparative advantage, especially agricultural commodities (often sugar, rice, meat, 
and dairy) and labor-intensive manufactures, such as textiles, apparel, and footwear. The 
effects of these politically-driven exclusions are further magnified by the structural weaknesses 
in the economies of LDCs, which are generally not very diversified. Thus, even a small number 
of product exclusions can rob preference programs of much of the potential benefit. In addition 
to the remaining formal barriers, preferential arrangements have rules of origin that restrict 
international sourcing of inputs and that is an acute concern in poorer countries with a high 
degree of specialization in the manufacturing sector, and limited ability to create the backward 
and forward linkages required by many origin regimes.
 In broad terms, there are two principal sources 
of the LDCs’ poor export performance: severe supply-side challenges, resulting from a lack of 
sound institutions and policies, inadequate infrastructure, and a paucity of physical and human 
capital; and implicit discrimination against their exports in rich-country trade policies. Progress 
is being made in a number of countries in addressing the supply-side challenges, but these 
problems will not be solved easily or quickly. The second source of poor export performance in 
poor countries should be more amenable to reform, as it requires only that richer countries 
open their markets to countries accounting for a tiny share of global trade. Opening markets for 
LDC exports is now even more important and more urgent as a result of the global financial 
crisis and the increased demand for trade protection around the world.  
2
                                                           
1 Data is for today’s list of LDCs (because the list changed over time) and is from the United Nations Comtrade 
database and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. 
2 In assessing the potential to expand poor-country exports, it is important to keep in mind that administrative and 
regulatory barriers also arise outside the preference programs themselves. Most notably for some LDCs in Africa, 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards to protect human, plant, and animal safety frequently block agricultural 
exports because many poor countries lack the capacity to certify compliance. 
  
To boost LDC engagement in global markets as a tool of poverty reduction, UN members agreed 
in the 2000 Millennium Declaration that developed countries should provide duty-free, quota-
free (DFQF) market access for LDCs. That Millennium Development Goal (MDG) was reaffirmed 
at the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Hong Kong in 2005, except that U.S. 
negotiators insisted on limiting it to 97 percent of tariff lines. At the same time, the 
communiqué also called on developing countries “in a position to do so” to provide expanded 
preferential access for LDCs. 
 
This study assesses four broad questions around improved market access for poor countries:  
 
-  How much would LDCs gain from 100 percent versus 97 percent DFQF market access in 
OECD markets? 
-  How would the distribution of gains and losses change if eligibility for DFQF access were 
extended to additional small and poor countries? 
-  How much would LDC gains rise if Brazil, China, and India also provide full market 
access? 
-  What would be the effect of improved access on producers in preference-giving 
countries? 
 
Previous analyses have assessed the impact of such preferential agreements granted to LDCs.  
Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) use the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) and the fourth 
version of the  GTAP database (1995) to measure  the gains and losses for a Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries’ group (the 37 poorest countries aggregated together) if they receive DFQF market 
access from the Quad countries (Canada, European Union, the United States and Japan). Bora, 
Cernat and Turrini (2002) worked on simulating the elimination of all tariff and non tariff 
barriers imposed against LDCs in order to confirm the benefits for LDCs of the EBA initiative and 
underline the potential impact of a coordinated action of Quad countries.They showed that this 
larger preferential initiative provides ten times the  welfare gains of the EBA alone. They 
conduct their analysis on the basis of a newer GTAP database than Ianchovichina, Mattoo and 
Olarreaga. Thanks to a higher level of disaggregation in the more recent database, authors are 
able to highlight the importance of sensitive sectors such as rice, sugar or wearing apparel in 
the improvement of LDCs’ market access, including both African and Asian countries. All those 
studies show the potential benefits for preference-receiving LDCs, and insignificant losses for 
preference-giving  countries imports from LDCs are such a small share of imports and 
consumption. Finally, Vanzetti and Peters (2009) focus on the role of sensitive products and the 
gains from an extension of product coverage of preferential arrangements.  All these studies 
emphasize the role of rich countries, especially the European Union in granting better market 
access for poorer countries at little or no cost to their own producers.  
Four key things distinguish our work from these earlier studies. First, we go beyond the Quad 
countries and examine the potential impact when the large and fast-growing emerging markets 
also  provide  improved market access to the LDCs. Second, we pay close attention to the 
potential for preference erosion when existing preference arrangements are changed. Third, 
we use the MIRAGE model and the carefully compiled and detailed MacMAps-HS6 database. 
Finally, unlike previous analyses,  we  use an explicit  political-economy welfare function to 
identify the sensitive products that are likely to be excluded if DFQF access is provided for only 
97 percent of tariff lines, as proposed in Hong Kong. More ad hoc methods may underestimate 
the negative impact of such exclusions, as explained by Jean et al. (2010). The political economy 
model  developed by Jean et al.  (2010) assumes  that governments optimize their objective 
function  by  choosing sensitive sectors that minimize the social cost.   We employ this 
methodology to treat the small number of tariffs lines that are defined as sensitive in our 
scenarios with 97 percent tariff line coverage
3
                                                           
3 To see the detailed tariffs lines obtained by this procedure, please refer to the Annex Table 2  
. To preview the results, the analysis confirms the  
 
conclusion from previous research  that  a DFQF initiative  limiting product coverage to 97 
percent of tariff lines provides very few benefits for LDCs. And, the gains from full access are 
multiplied if the large emerging markets join the initiative. But the evidence does not support 
two of the chief concerns about expanded preferential access for those countries. First, sub-
Saharan Africa generally stands to gain, not lose, if OECD countries, including the United States, 
provide 100 percent DFQF market access for all LDCs; and other developing countries, such as 
Pakistan, do not suffer from preference erosion. Second, preference-giving countries do not 
suffer market disruption from removing exclusions for sensitive products, such as sugar or 
dairy. The adjustments are greater, however, if DFQF market access is extended to a broader 
group of small and poor countries.  
Before explaining the methodology used in the paper, Box 1 presents key trade characteristics 
of LDCs
4
                                                           
4 . As will be explained in more detail, the reliability of the data regarding some of the LDCs means that some 
countries are included in more aggregated regions. Our aggregation choices are explained in the main text. 
 













Box 1: Key factors in LDC trade performance 
 
















Textiles  35.7  12.6  13.8 
Wearing apparel  30.3  12.2  12.9 
Leather  4.6  4.6  13.8 
Madagascar 
Foods products  10.6  6.6  5.2 
Textiles  8.9  3.1  1.5 
Malawi 
Other crops  24.9  64.9  52.3 
Coal, oil, gas  16.8  2.1  3.9 
Rest of Africa 
Other. mfd. products  21.8  0.5  1.2 
Chemical products  7.6  0.7  1.3 
Rest of South East Asia 
Coal, oil, gas  41.4  5.3  0.6 
Wearing apparel  15.9  6.4  5.9 
Textiles  11.3  4.0  7.8 
Senegal 
Chemical products  21.1  2.0  1.2 
Foods products  14.7  9.1  24.9 
Other. mfd. products  12.2  0.3  6.1 
1 these are GTAP sectors 
       
  2 
 
with r the reporter and s its partners, i(j) the sectors. 
 
3 OECD sectoral tariffs are weighted by the share of each partner in total exports. 
 
The  above  table  underscores that for many  LDCs, comparative advantage and exports are 
relatively concentrated in a few sectors and in many cases (Bangladesh in textile and wearing 
apparel; Malawi in tobacco (other crops)) they face unusually high levels of protection. 
 
The table below gives a further idea of the high degree of inter-industry specialization in many 
LDCs. The inter-industry specialization index (see footnote 4 for its construction) shows that all 
of them have high degrees of specialization in comparison with developed countries (around 
0.20-0.25 for France, Germany, the US and even China 0.33). As reflected in Note 4, a high level 
of this index means that LDCs are dangerously specializing in few products, so their trade is 

































Bangladesh  0.693 
Textiles  35.733  12.550 
Apparel  30.329  12.199 
Services  12.764  1.226 
Leather  4.603  4.644 
Foods products  4.359  2.702 
Ethiopia  0.727 
Transport  18.061  4.120 
Services  17.914  1.721 
Other crops  12.657  32.947 
Sugar  9.287  60.082 
Trade  8.197  3.569 
Madagascar  0.659 
Coal, oil, gas  19.915  2.530 
Sugar  15.336  99.212 
Foods products  10.609  6.576 
Transport  9.107  2.078 
Textiles  8.890  3.122 
Malawi  0.846 
Sugar  42.192  272.961 
Other crops  24.915  64.855 
Coal, oil, gas  16.803  2.135 
Other mfd. products  2.514  0.052 
Cotton, wool, silk  2.227  5.833 
Mozambique  0.674 
Metals  51.946  18.640 
Services  20.284  1.948 
Sugar  5.152  33.328 
Foods products  4.627  2.868 




Coal, oil, gas  44.560  5.662 
Other mfd. products  21.810  0.451 
Chemical products  7.602  0.729 
Minerals  0.000  0.718 





Coal, oil, gas  41.399  5.260 
Apparel  15.888  6.391 
Textiles  11.259  3.954 
Other. mfd. products  9.231  0.191 
Services  7.052  0.677 
Senegal  0.479 
Services  22.069  2.120 
Chemical products  21.118  2.025 
Food products  14.711  9.119 
Other mfd. products  12.240  0.253 
Transport  10.395  2.372 
3 
 
With this formula, we obtain the inter-industry specialization indicator that the higher it is, the more the trade 
balance is based on a small number of sectors, and conversely, the lower it is, it provides a better distribution of 




The MIRAGE (Modeling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium) model is a 
multi-sector, dynamic, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model devoted to 
trade policy analysis. The model is extensively described in Decreux and Valin (2007)and the 
implications of its features compared with other CGE models are analyzed in Bouët (2008).  
Why choose a general equilibrium model? The partial equilibrium methodology has advantages 
in terms of being more transparent in its assumptions and easier for non-experts to 
understand. But both have a role and we incorporate both here, comparing the CGE results to 
those from Laborde (2008) using detailed data and a partial equilibrium approach.  
The advantage of general over partial equilibrium models is that they take into account the 
economy-wide effects of trade liberalization, not just the sectoral changes induced by tariff 
changes.  Specifically, when tariffs are lowered,  the sector  production  contracts,  decreasing 
demand for factors of production used extensively in that sector, as well as the remuneration of 
those factors. This, in turn, affects production in other sectors, which cannot be observed in the 
partial equilibrium framework. Trade liberalization also implies a decrease in tariff revenues for 
importing countries, which can involve contraction in services or public transfers.
5
Here, simulations are run until 2020 to measure the long-term impact of the policy scenarios. 
The model is applied using data on the economic structure and trade of 113 countries in 57 
sectors from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database version 7 (Narayanan and 
Walmsley, 2008), and data on trade policies, including preferential tariff levels, from the 
MAcMapHS6 version 2database (Boumellassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna, 2009).
 All these 
economic-wide effects need to be evaluated to appreciate  the  full  impact of trade 
liberalization. In addition, the MIRAGE model incorporates recursive dynamics (Bouët 2008), 
which involves simulating the trade shock  over a period of 10 years (considered as a 
benchmark) to reflect global economic changes resulting from changes to capital stocks or land 
supply due to changes in remuneration.  
6
                                                           
5It is important to underline that in most cases the main resource for LDC governments is tariff revenues. 
6  The MAcMapHS6 database has the most detailed information available on market access barriers and 
preferential trading arrangements, including bound and applied tariffs under World Trade Organization rules, and 
preferential tariffs arising from reciprocal regional trade agreements or unilateral preference programs, such as 
those studied here. 
 
While these tools have been widely used in numerous assessments of global or regional trade 
agreements, specific modifications have been done for this study. First, the tariff data set has 
been updated so that the baseline reflects important trade policy changes since MAcMapHS6 
was last updated in 2004 (see next section). Second, the trade matrix was adjusted to 
discriminate between "real" trade and virtual (or potential) trade. Our focus on LDCs requires 
particular care in the use of the data because of weaknesses and gaps in reporting by those 
countries and the problems are compounded in the case of potential exports that are blocked 
by prohibitive tariffs in importing countries.  
  
 
To make the modeling and analysis tractable, the data have been aggregated into 36 countries 
or regions and 28 sectors, with a focus on LDCs and the products they export. The geographic 
and sectoral composition are shown in Annex Table 1. Our aggregation program is based on 
four criteria of selection to justify why some countries of interest are included in larger regions: 
the availability of the data, the reliability of the data, export and country specialization 
similarities, and consideration of existing preferential programs.   
First, the geographic coverage is constrained in the sense that it depends on the availability of 
good  quality,  recent input-output tables. The GTAP database does not supply consistent 
information for all countries but presents data for regional aggregates
7
To address the problems created by constructed trade values, we split the GTAP trade matrix 
into two categories: real trade flows, based on the trade data inputs to the GTAP database by 
Mark Gehlhar, and virtual ones.
.  The second issue is the 
reliability of existing data and some obvious inconsistencies can be identified that should be 
corrected.  
For example, in the case of potential exports that are currently blocked by prohibitive tariffs, 
the trade matrix in the GTAP database allows for the possibility of trade creation by using 
constructed trade values instead of zeroes. To illustrate, the trade matrix of the GTAP database 
includes "virtual" merchandise trade flows related to travel expenditures: rather than treating 
them as an export of services, so that the expenses of a Japanese tourist in Cambodia are 
translated in the database as a dutiable export of the consumed goods from Cambodia to 
Japan. But these “virtual” trade flows can be problematic in our assessment when it creates 
non-negligible exports from a LDC to an OECD country after removal of a high tariff on a specific 
commodity. For instance, the GTAP database displays a virtual export of processed rice of about 
$100,000 by Senegal to Japan to avoid a zero and allow for the possibility of exports if Japan’s 
340 percent tariff  on rice were removed. Based on the model parameters (Armington 
elasticities for imperfect substitutes), however, the elimination of the duty can lead to a 15-fold 
increase in Senegalese exports of rice to Japan. Unfortunately, this flow is purely artificial and 
there is no way of knowing whether trade liberalization would boost Senegalese exports or by 
how much, given high transportation costs and other constraints. Due to the magnitude of the 
shock, this sort of problem could lead to significant bias in our results.  
8
                                                           
7 The list of GTAP aggregates is following: Rest of Oceania, Rest of East Asia, Rest of Southest Asia, Rest of South 
Asia, Rest of North America, Rest of South America, Rest of EFTA, Rest of Former Soviet countries, Rest of Europe, 
Rest of Western Asia, Rest of Western Africa, Rest of Central Africa, Rest of Eastern Africa, Rest of North Africa, 
Rest of South African Customs Unions.  These regions include some of the least developed countries. 
  Tariffs, and their elimination, will affect only the former 
category and since the liberalization is by more developed and advanced developing countries 
that have good data, this is not a problem for our analysis. In addition, we have checked the 
quality of the input-output tables for key products in the LDC countries we focus on to avoid 
important mistakes due to data quality problems. For instance, the GTAP7 database shows that 
15 percent of the production cost of processed rice in Senegal is due to imported wheat and 0 
percent to the local paddy rice. This mistake in the construction of the IO table will also lead to 
serious problems in the CGE assessment since it implies that Senegal can export rice without 
8 See the description of the database at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/trade_data.asp.  
 
producing it and simply by importing wheat. We fix such issues by reallocating the intermediate 
consumption to the appropriate sector in the IO table.  
Unfortunately, since the poorest countries have the least-available and lowest-quality data, 
many of the LDCs that we are interested in examining are either missing or have only partial 
data and can be included only on a weighted basis in larger regional aggregates. To illustrate, 
consider the aggregated region of “rest of Africa”. This region is composed of heterogeneous 
states, including LDCs such as Benin, Guinea, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi or Rwanda but 
also some vulnerable economies that are not eligible for DFQF programs, such as Cameroon, 
Kenya, Namibia or Swaziland. But, all these countries are already included in sub regional zones 
in the GTAP database. There are only two LDCs that could be isolated: Uganda and Tanzania but 
they suffer from severe unreliability of the data, since the latest IO tables date back to 1992. 
With those caveats, we tried to select for special analysis a range of LDCs from Africa (Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal) and Asia (Bangladesh, Laos/Cambodia
9
The first issue is to identify where we are now with respect to LDC market access. The 
Millennium Declaration approved by UN members in 2000 called for developed countries to 
provide DFQF market access for LDCs on essentially all products. The ministerial communiqué 
released by the WTO in Hong Kong in 2005 reaffirmed this commitment, but, at the insistence 
of U.S. negotiators, defined “essentially all products” as 97 percent of tariff lines.
) that produce a range of 
products, both clothing and agricultural products. Similar factors around regional and export 
diversity drove the decision on which other small and vulnerable economies, and which 
preference-giving countries to isolate in the analysis.  For preference-giving countries, the 
aggregation program is clearly conducted by the similarity of trade policies and by the 
perspective given for any preferential agreement.  For instance, Australia and New Zealand 
belong to the same free trade zone and apply the same preferential agreements.  Furthermore, 
one of our main objective is to accentuate the role of emerging markets in helping the LDCs, 




Most of Europe has already opened markets for 100 percent of exports from LDCs, as have 
Australia and New Zealand.
 
11 Japan and Canada provide access for over 98 percent of products 
for LDCs, while the United States provides duty-free  access for only around 80 percent of 
products for LDCs outside sub-Saharan Africa and Haiti, and South Korea’s preference program 
for LDCs covered only 75 percent of tariff lines at the time the analysis was done.
12
                                                           
9 Laos and Cambodia are two Asian LDCs with similar export profiles that have been grouped into one region 
because of data issues. 
10 See, for example, the analysis in Oxfam International (2005). 
11 We ignore the fact that the EU program excludes armaments as they are commercially insignificant. 
12  In January 2010, South Korea raised the product coverage of its program to 85 percent tariff lines and 
announced that it will further raise the coverage to 95 percent by 2012. 
 Among 
other OECD countries, Turkey provides DFQF access for most products outside agriculture and 
Mexico does not yet have a preference program. India and China also adopted preference  
 
programs for LDCs in recent years. These programs are described in more detail in Elliott 
(2009). Finally, at the WTO ministers’ meeting in Geneva in December 2009, Brazil announced 
that it would introduce a program in 2010, rather than waiting for the conclusion of the Doha 
Round, as it had earlier insisted.
13
-  expanded duty-free access for LDCs in 
 
Since the MAcMapHS6 version 2 database is based on 2004 data, we needed to update the 
database to reflect relevant trade policy changes occurring since then, including: 
o  Japan 
o  South Korea 
o  India 
o  China 
o  Switzerland 
o  Turkey 
-  the phasing out of the implementation period for the protocol products in the EU27 for 
the EBA (rice, sugar, bananas) 
-  implementation of free trade agreements between 
o  the United States and Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) 
o  India and South Asian neighbors (SAFTA) 
o  the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU27 and ACP countries that 
have signed an agreement or at least an interim agreements. 
 
The Scenarios 
In order to explore a range of possible outcomes, we analyzed 4 different scenarios: 
A.  97% of tariff lines liberalized by OECD countries for LDCs. 
B.  100% DFQF given by OECD countries to LDCs. 
C.  100% DFQF given by OECD countries to LDCs. and other designated countries (small and 
vulnerable economies - SVEs -). 
D.  100% DFQF given by OECD countries plus Brazil, China, and India to LDCs. 
 
All scenarios are implemented in 2010. 
 
In  the first scenario, liberalization only applies to 97% of tariff lines and preference-giving 
countries are free to select the products excluded. In this case, we use the political economy 
criterion developed by Jean et al., (2010) to select the tariff lines excluded from liberalization. 
This approach is central to this study in the sense that it is more realistic to assume that giving-
countries optimize their trade policies, taking into account politically-sensitive products
14
                                                           
13 See his statement at 
. It is 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/min09_statements_e.htm.  
14 The initial model of Jean et al (2010) concerns only agricultural products. Actually, one important assumption of 
their modeling is that the share of agricultural dutiable imports in total expenditure of importers is small. In our 
context, some manufactured products are included in the list of potential sensitive products, but obviously this 
assumption is also respected:  in implementing the simplified version of the Jean et al. (2010) criteria, we just 
assume that for each product imported from LDCs, the share in total expenditures is small to have the parameter  
 
based on a political economy approach where the government (common agent) gives 
protection to economic sectors (multi-principals) against financial transfers and maximizes a 
function which includes national welfare and these financial transfers. As a result of this model, 
the government is supposed to select lines which maximize a political economy indicator 
depending positively on the height of the tariff and the magnitude of imports
15
With the Mirage model simulations, it is possible to underline some interesting results that 
would be generated by these different scenarios, and in particular the distribution of potential 
gains and losses in terms of exports, production variation and social welfare. Welfare variation 
in this model is estimated on the basis of the Hicksian concepts of equivalent variation
.  
 
Here, it is important to point out that if the method of Jean et al (2010) is a rigorous approach, 
two conceptual limits have to be remembered.  
First, governments maximize a welfare objective function without taking into account changes 
in foreign trade policies. Thus the Jean et al. (2010) approach considers that each country 
makes its choices independently from the rest of the world. This can be interpreted as each 
country being small and a price taker on its imports.    
 
Second, in the model of Jean et al. (2010) the prediction is that a single tariff applies to each 
product from all trade partners. But in reality, the pre-DFQF regime embodies a host of bilateral 
and regional trade agreements  that stipulate different levels of bilateral tariffs.  The 
interpretation  of the Jean et al. (2010) model  used here is adjusted to accommodate  this 
dimension.  In the present approach, we consider that each pair product-exporter is a 
differentiated product in the CES function. 
 
16
Before exploring and analyzing the results, it is important to emphasize the implications of 
using  Armington  elasticities, which assume that imported and domestic products are 
heterogeneous  and,  therefore, that substitution between them is more limited than with 
homogeneous products. That, in turn, means that the predicted values of the trade changes (in 
response to prices variation) are smaller than those implied by models with homogeneous 
. In 
addition to the impact on different groups of preference beneficiaries, we are also interested in 
the impact on production  in the preference-giving countries. The remaining tariff peaks in 
developed countries are the result of lobbying by powerful political constituencies, so, in order 
to assess the political feasibility of various scenarios, it is important to analyze the impact in 
those countries as well.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“1-s” in Jean et al. (2010) article close to 1, the import demand elasticity becoming the same for all goods under 
the CES assumption. 
15 It is noteworthy that the pre-DFQF protection structure needs to be a political optimum in order to calibrate the 
model and choosing sensitive products is done in a way that minimizes political welfare losses. We model here a 
process under which governments maximize their objective function under the constraint that DFQF is given to 
some partners with only 3% of tariff lines still taxed. Consequently the post-DFQF equilibrium is suboptimal 
compared to the initial case, but it is a new optimum under this new constraint. 
16The  Hicksian equivalent variation is defined as the monetary amount that would need to be given to the 
representative agent in order to reach the same level of welfare in the free trade case as under initial prices. 
  
 
products. Moreover the levels of these elasticities are equal to those used by the GTAP model, 
but are less than those used by the LINKAGE model at the World Bank. Thus, the Mirage model 
is quite conservative. 
 
The Impact of 100 percent Market Access in OECD Countries for LDCs 
Previous studies by Berisha-Krasniqi,  Bouët,  Laborde  and Mevel  (2008), among others, 
demonstrated that tariff peaks in rich countries are concentrated in a few tariff lines and, 
therefore, 97 percent duty-free access provides very little benefit.
17
In this section, we will focus on the results when OECD countries provide 100 percent DFQF 
market access, and we examine the effects both for those benefiting from DFQF market access 
and others that might suffer preference erosion.
 That result was confirmed 
by this analysis, which shows no LDC gaining even as much as one-tenth of one percent in 
additional exports from 97 percent product coverage. For similar reasons, including that LDC 
exports are relatively concentrated,  97 percent coverage by more advanced developing 
countries also results in relatively small export gains. For that reason, in the discussion that 
follows, we focus on the scenarios involving 100 percent DFQF market access. The results in 
terms of overall export changes for all scenarios are presented in Annex Table 3. 
18
DFQF recipients (LDCs) 
 Table 1 shows the change in exports and 
overall welfare for one Asian and four African LDCs, as well as two aggregates containing 
LDCs—Rest of Southeast Asia, which includes Cambodia and Laos (as well as oil exporter 
Brunei), and Rest of Africa, which contains a mix of LDCs, as well as other low- and middle-
income countries, making it particularly difficult to interpret. 
Table 1: World Average protection rates on LDCs exports, before and after DFQF 
Initial  Average 
protection on LDC 
exports
[1] 
Average protection on 
LDC exports after 
100% DFQF  Variation (%) 
Bangladesh  5.5%  3.3%  -39.848 
Ethiopia  9.7%  9.7%  -0.009 
Madagascar  1.7%  1.7%  -0.326 
Malawi  18.3%  6.3%  -65.508 
Mozambique  4.8%  4.8%  -0.010 
Rest of Africa  5.4%  5.1%  -3.976 
Rest of South East Asia  1.9%  1.2%  -34.788 
Senegal  5.8%  5.8%  -0.01 
 
 
                                                           
17See, for example, Hoeckman B, Ng F and Olarreaga M, 2002, Eliminating Excessive Tariffs on exports of Least 
Developed Countries 
18 Annex Table 3 shows the results for additional economy-wide variables for all countries and regions in the 
database for the two central scenarios:  where only the OECD provides 100 percent DFQF market access for LDCs, 
and where Brazil, China, and India do so as well.  
 
 
These figures illustrate how DFQF can generate relatively large reductions in average tariff for 
some LDCs. Average tariffs are weighted by the share of each sector in the national production 
(and not exports to avoid bias due to tariffs) and that means that countries that are most 
dependent on one or two sectors where they have a strong comparative advantage and face 
relatively high tariffs will experience sharper declines in the average protection rate that they 
face and that will allow them to boost their exports relatively more (Bangladesh, Malawi). 
Conversely, when the countries are relatively more diversified, or they concentrated in sectors 
with relatively low tariffs, such as some minerals, the impact will be less. For instance, if 
Mozambique should not expect a large decrease in the average tariff because more than half its 
exports are metals, which face low tariffs already.  The same can be said for Senegal, which is 
specialized in manufactured goods (chemical or food products) that generally face low tariffs. 
Conversely, Malawi is strongly specialized in non-manufactured tobacco (other crops), imports 
of which are highly taxed by the United States. It is important to underline that if emerging 
markets are included in the analysis, the case of Senegal, for instance, will be improved by the 
removal of Indian tariffs on chemical products that will boost Senegalese exports. 
 
Table2: Percentage change in Key Variables in 2020 from OECD implantation of 100% DFQF for LDCs 
(sorted by change in welfare). 
 
DFQF Recipients  Exports  Welfare 
 
Otherdeveloping countries  Exports  Welfare 
Malawi  12.97  2.65 
 
Mauritius  0.03  0.02 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  0.95 
 
Central America  0.14  0.01 
Ethiopia  1.35  0.29 
 
South Africa  0.02  0.00 
Bangladesh  4.16  0.29 
 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.39  0.17 
 
Middle East and North Africa  0.01  0.00 
Senegal  1.16  0.15 
 
Nigeria  0.01  0.00 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.03 
 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.00 
Madagascar  -0.03  -0.02 
 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  0.00 
       
China  -0.03  0.00 
       
India  -0.01  0.00 
       
Pakistan  -0.04  0.00 
       
Philippines  -0.01  0.00 
       
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01 
       
Brazil  -0.03  -0.01 
       
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.01 
       
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.01 
       
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.01 
       
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03 
 
Turning to changes in exports and welfare, the model suggests that Madagascar might suffer 
very small losses, but all other LDCs for which we have data show gains from 100 percent DFQF 
access in OECD markets. It is also notable, given the concerns about the extension of U.S.  
 
preferences to Asian apparel exporters that the export losses in Madagascar in this scenario 
come in agriculture, not the apparel sector. Additional details on the potential implications of 
these changes for sub-Saharan African LDCs are discussed in Box 2 at the end of this section. 
Moreover, these small losses are reversed if the major emerging markets also provide duty-
free, quota-free market access (see discussion below and Annex Table 4).   
Overall, Malawi is the biggest gainer by far because of an unusual set of circumstances—a 
relatively high dependence on tobacco exports facing an unusually high, 350 percent, tariff in 
the U.S. market, which leads to a sharp increase in exports of that product. Thus, this case also 
underscores the need for complementary government policies to guard against increased 
export concentration and commodity dependence when trade barriers are lifted.  
The reported gains for the rest of Africa region are noticeably smaller than for the individual 
African LDCs and this could be due to the fact that only a subset of countries in the aggregation 
are LDCs that receive expanded access.  As expected, an examination of more detailed results 
for Southeast Asia shows that the gains are mostly due to increased exports of apparel to the 
U.S. market, as are the gains for Bangladesh. The sectoral change in exports, by country or 
region, for this scenario is shown in Annex Table 5. The increased export of apparel from 
Southeast Asia probably represents mostly exports from Cambodia, since Laos is small and has 
very little export capacity and Brunei, the third country in that aggregate, exports mostly oil and 
faces low tariffs. 
What is also notable in Table 2 is that other competing countries that might be expected to 
suffer from preference erosion—Mauritius, South Africa, and Central America—instead show 
gains, albeit very small. And for other developing countries, if they suffer losses at all, estimated 
losses fall well below one-tenth of one percent of total exports or national income. 
To put the potential gains in some perspective, we can compare them to two other sets of 
results—general equilibrium estimates of the welfare gains from global free trade, and partial 
equilibrium estimates of the export gains of moving from 97 percent to 100 percent product 
coverage in the context of a feasible Doha Round outcome (based on what was on the table in 
the summer of 2008 when the talks collapsed).   
With respect to the gains from global free trade, Bouët (2008) uses the same MIRAGE model 
and estimates that global free trade would produce average welfare gains of around 0.8% of 
national income for low-income countries. In contrast to unilateral trade preferences in OECD 
markets, global free trade would bring additional gains from access to other developing-country 
markets, as well as from these countries’ liberalization of their own markets. Thus, it is notable 
that the estimated benefits from 100 percent market access for LDCs show welfare gains well 
above the level estimated for global free trade for Malawi and Southeast Asia, and of more 
than a third of that level for Bangladesh and Ethiopia.  
While they are the only technique for showing the global distribution of gains and losses from 
changes in trade policy, computable general equilibrium models have features that make the 
size of the estimates quite conservative.  To suggest the range of possible benefits, Table 3 
contrasts the CGE results for LDCs with estimates from Laborde (2008), which uses a less  
 
conservative, partial equilibrium, approach that takes into account only potential changes in 




In addition to using a different estimation method, the Laborde results are in the 
context of the WTO’s Doha Round and thus cover only the 32 WTO members. 
The partial equilibrium analysis suggests that total LDC exports could increase as much as $2 
billion, or 17 percent. The largest relative gains in both sets of estimates go to Malawi, as well 
as the Asian LDCs that face tariff peaks on their exports of apparel to the U.S. market. Other 
African LDCs see smaller gains, but that is not surprising since they generally have good access 
in their major markets. The partial equilibrium estimates of gross gains are also available for 
other LDCs that are members of the WTO and those show large gains for Benin and Sierra 
Leone, and gains of a quarter or more, relative to base-year exports, for Maldives, Nepal, and 
Niger (Laborde 2008, p. 22).  
Table 3: Percentage Variation in Exports for two scenarios in two models  
100 % OECD DFQF  100 % OECD + MICS
b 
 
General Equilibrium  Partial Equilibium
 a  General Equilibrium  Partial Equilibium 
 
Bangladesh  4.16  28.96  4.82  38.55 
Cambodia
c  2.52  31.27  2.55  32.96 
Clothing  19.49  n.a.  19.51  n.a. 
Ethiopia  1.35  n.a.  2.24  n.a. 
Madagascar  -0.03  -0.74  0.57  20.61 
Malawi  12.97  215.08  13.91  240.41 
Mozambique  0.39  16.29  1.41  128.11 
Senegal  1.16  8.46  9.38  64.83 
All WTO LDCs
d (%)  n.a.  16.97  n.a.  44.36 
All WTO LDCs
b (million dollars)  2 108     7 731 
n.a. = not available. 
      a. Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United States; the EU is excluded because it provides 100 percent DFQF. 
b. The CGE model includes South Korea and Mexico in OECD, while the partial equilibrium includes them with Brazil, 
China, and India as middle-income countries. 
c. In the CGE model, the results are for the regional aggregate, "rest of South East Asia," which includes Laos and 
Brunei, as well as Cambodia, which dominates exports. 
d. The partial equilibrium estimates are in the context of a Doha Round agreement and thus only include WTO LDCs. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the general nor the partial equilibrium estimates 
account for rules of origin or other administrative obstacles that can block access, even when 
traditional trade barriers are eliminated.  Thus, the benefits are likely underestimated because 
they assume full access in the EU market, despite restrictive rules of origin in the EBA program 
                                                           
19 In this model, LDCs have no supply constraints and react perfectly to the increased demand for their products 
when barriers are removed. See Fontagne, Laborde, and Mitaritonna (2008) for details.  
 
that are known to inhibit exports.
20 But the benefits of moving to 100 percent DFQF access in 
other markets would also be less than estimated here if programs for LDCs create or retain 
similar obstacles. That underscores the importance of including changes to restrictive rules of 























                                                           
20 Additional benefits might now be realized as a result of the EU’s announcement of new, less restrictive rules of 
origin under the EBA program, especially with respect to fish and apparel. 
21  Information on the working group, as well as the final report, may be found at 
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/reformingtradepreferences/global_trade_preference_reform.  
Box 2 The Impact on Africa of 100 percent DFQF Market Access in the United States 
Currently, Asian LDCs are outside of the more generous regional preference programs offered by the 
United States and because the GSP program that is available to them excludes apparel, they are 
among the biggest potential gainers from the adoption of 100 percent DFQF access in the U.S. market. 
But the potential increase in competition raises concerns among existing preference beneficiaries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where a handful of countries have been able to take advantage of 
AGOA to increase apparel exports. Unfortunately, our ability to explore these issues in the detail we 
would like is inhibited by lack of data: of the five major African apparel exporters (accounting for 90 
percent of exports under AGOA), we have disaggregated data for only one LDC, Madagascar, as well as 
for Mauritius. Kenya, Lesotho, and Swaziland are included in the Rest of Africa aggregate. 
The results that we have do not suggest that African apparel exporters will systematically lose out. 
More disaggregated results do show modest reductions in African apparel exports to the United 
States, generally in a range of one to one and a half percent of current exports. But if U.S. reform is 
embedded in broader global reform, as modeled here, sub-Saharan African exporters gain access in 
other markets as trade flows adjust globally.  
As noted above, Madagascar is the only significant African LDC apparel exporter for which there is data 
and, while Madagascar is also the only country that does not gain from 100 percent DFQF market 
access in OECD countries, that result is not due to preference erosion in apparel. As shown in annex 
table 4, there is essentially no change in Madagascar’s exports of apparel under this scenario. As also 
shown in that table, Mozambique, which is not currently a major exporter of apparel, would see a 
small gain, as would South Africa, a non-LDC. Mauritius, a major exporter and non-LDC, would see a 
very small loss, while Ethiopia, Malawi, and Senegal, which export very little apparel, would shift 
resources from that sector to others. It is also important to note, however, that rules of origin are not 
addressed here and the recently announced changes to those rules in the European Union are 
important in allowing adjustment to occur in that market as well. 
Moreover, 100 percent product coverage is of benefit to Africa generally because benefits are 
currently narrowly concentrated in a few countries and products, mainly oil, and full coverage would 
eliminate the exclusions on agricultural exports.
1  To the degree that there are losses from expanding 
preferences for all LDCs, it would be preferable to address these through targeted measures to 
increase competitiveness or to compensate the adjustment, rather than discriminating among LDCs.  
 
What Happens if the OECD Extends 100 Percent Access to Other Small, Poor Countries?  
We tested a  different scenario for extending eligibility for DFQF market access in OECD 
countries beyond LDCs, where other small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) are included in the 
preferential program. More precisely,  the additional small and vulnerable countries that fall 
below the World Bank’s low middle-income (per capita) threshold with total national incomes 
below $50 billion, which excludes Pakistan and Vietnam because they are large, become DFQF 
recipients. 
In addition, to test the sensitivity of the results to the country classification chosen, we 
implemented a fifth scenario that extends DFQF to all low-income-Countries (including VietNam 
and Pakistan in spite of their relatively large size). This scenario may also be of interest because 
both the EU and United States are considering extending some additional market access to 
Pakistan in the wake of last summer’s floods. 
Table 4 shows the estimated change in exports for potential beneficiaries, as well as those left 
out, under each scenario and compares them to the LDC-only scenario.  In general, extending 
DFQF market access to other low-income countries, even when Pakistan and Vietnam are 
included, entails generally small losses for both LDC beneficiaries and excluded countries, and, 
when they are included, large gains for Pakistan and Vietnam. There are losses for Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines, and Central America, but they remain well under one-half of one percent in those 
cases. Unfortunately, the benefits for the smaller low-income countries are harder to assess 
because of data limitations, with only Pakistan and Vietnam having sufficient information 
available to assess the impact in detail. The increase in exports for the rest of Africa region 
could be due to increased benefits for low-income countries in that region. 
Extending DFQF market access to other small and low middle-income countries creates large 
export gains for those countries for which we have data, especially Paraguay (17%) and Sri 
Lanka (21%). The African, Central American, and Latin American residual regional aggregates 
also gain, presumably because they include small, low middle-income countries that would gain 
from additional access. But this scenario leads to modest reductions in the gains for Asian LDCs 
and either larger declines in gains or outright losses for African LDCs, including of more than 1 
percent of exports for Ethiopia and Madagascar. The inclusion of low income countries, 
especially from Latin America and Asia, will expand the scope of products on which African LDCs 
will face increased competition, particularly  in agriculture. Preference erosion losses also 







Table 4: Percentage Change in Export Volume in 2020 in Scenarios Where OECD Grants 100% DFQF 
Region  B_ LDCsonly  C_OtherSVEs  All LICs
(1) 
LDCs 
Bangladesh  4.16  3.46  3.38 
Ethiopia  1.35  -0.49  0.90 
Madagascar  -0.03  -2.28  -0.70 
Malawi  12.97  4.71  11.15 
Mozambique  0.39  -0.48  0.21 
Senegal  1.16  0.80  1.12 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  2.40  2.25 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.49  0.29 
           
Low-income countries 
Pakistan  -0.04  -0.05  11.90 
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.06  18.00 
           
AdditionalSVEs 
Bolivia  -0.03  3.46  -0.02 
Paraguay  -0.04  16.95  -0.03 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  20.94  -0.27 
           
Otherdeveloping countries 
Brazil  -0.03  -0.12  -0.07 
China  -0.03  -0.06  -0.10 
India  -0.01  -0.04  0.04 
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.07  0.02 
Mauritius  0.03  -1.96  -0.35 
Nigeria  0.01  0.03  0.03 
Philippines  -0.01  -0.07  -0.17 
South Africa  0.02  -0.02  0.04 
Central America  0.14  0.83  -0.02 
Middle East and North 
Africa  0.01  3.51  0.00 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.00  0.08 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.12  0.10 
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  0.78  -0.07 





How Important is Improved Access in Large, Emerging Markets? 
For some countries, particularly in Africa, extension of full market access by large emerging 
markets would significantly expand the potential gains from unilateral preference programs. In 
these scenarios, we include as emerging markets China and India, which have implemented 
partial duty-free preferences for LDCs, and Brazil, which also recently announced that it will 
introduce a program soon.
22 China announced a few years ago that it would provide duty-free, 
quota-free access on 440 tariff lines for 30 sub-Saharan African with which it has diplomatic 
relations and then announced an expansion of that in late 2009 to 95 percent of tariff lines. It 
also offers DFQF on a smaller number of tariff lines to Asian LDCs with whom it has relations. 
India’s programs provide DFQF market access on 85 percent of tariff lines and partial duty 
reductions on another 9 percent, phased in over several years. The announcement by Foreign 
Minister Celso  Amorimin Geneva last year said that Brazil would begin providing duty-free 
access for LDCs on 80 percent of items by the end of 2010 and then increase coverage to “all 
tariff lines” over four years.
23
 Unfortunately, we do not have full information on these programs and we have to make some 
assumptions to identify the products likely to be excluded in the partial  product  coverage 
scenario, which could skew the results somewhat. From what we do know about these 
programs, the political economy and the range of import-sensitive products appear to be 
similar to what we find in OECD countries. Thus, China’s original list of covered products 
excluded cotton, sugar, most fruits and vegetables, and a number of textile and apparel 
products. India includes sugar and cotton, but excludes a number of other agricultural products 
and offers no or only partial preferences on many textile and apparel products. Textiles and 
apparel were also raised as sensitive by industry groups in Brazil.
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22 Turkey is included as a member of the OECD in those simulations. 
 
The analysis suggests that meaningful impact on LDC exports and welfare (Table 5 and Annex 






23 Because Minister Amorim’s statement also refers to the Hong Kong communiqué, it is not entirely clear whether 
the commitment is to eventually cover 100 percent or 97 percent of tariff lines. See his statement on the WTO 
website at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/min09_statements_e.htm.  
24 On China, see Minson (2007); for a comparison of China and India, drawing on the political economy literature, 
see Engel (processed); and on Brazil, see Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest,  Vol. 10, Number 41, December 
6,2006.  
 
Table 5: Comparing the Percentage Change in Export Volume in 2020 when Brazil, China, and India 
also grant 100% DFQF to LDCs 
LDCs  OECD only  OECD + EMs 
 
EMs  OECD only  OECD + EMs 
Malawi  12.97  13.91 
 
Brazil  -0.03  0.00 
Senegal  1.16  9.38 
 
China  -0.03  -0.02 
Bangladesh  4.16  4.82 
 
India  -0.01  0.64 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  2.55 
        Ethiopia  1.35  2.24 
        Mozambique  0.39  1.41 
        Madagascar  -0.03  0.57 
        Rest of Africa  0.08  0.22 
       
              Otherdeveloping countries  OECD only  OECD + EMs 
        Bolivia  -0.03  -0.04 
        Central America  0.14  0.14 
        Indonesia  -0.03  -0.03 
        Mauritius  0.03  0.05 
        Middle East and North Africa  0.01  0.00 
        Nigeria  0.01  -0.13 
        Pakistan  -0.04  -0.06 
        Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03 
        Philippines  -0.01  -0.02 
        Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.01 
        Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.01 
        Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.04 
        South Africa  0.02  0.03 
        Sri Lanka  -0.01  -0.05 
        Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01 
         
Focusing on the 100 percent product coverage scenario where emerging markets join OECD 
countries, this is the only scenario examined where Madagascar shifts from small losses to 
small gains. This scenario also results in more marked increased gains for several other LDCs in 
Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Senegal, with more modest additional benefits 
for the Asian LDCs. The African regional aggregate also sees a large relative gain, though it 
remains small in absolute terms. 
The partial equilibrium estimates in Table 2 show a similar distribution of gains, but of a much 
larger magnitude. In this scenario, exports from Madagascar, Mozambique, and Senegal could 
increase by as much as 21 percent, 128 percent, 65 percent, respectively, compared to 
increases of 10 percent or less in the general equilibrium modeling. Overall, the partial 
equilibrium estimates for all WTO LDCs suggest an average increase in exports of up to 44 
percent, worth an additional $8 billion for these countries.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting result in the general equilibrium analysis is that all three emerging 
markets granting 100 percent DFQF market access improve their position relative to the 
scenario where only the OECD grants DFQF market access to LDCs. Other developing countries 
see little or no preference erosion as a result of the expanded access for LDCs (Table 4). 
What is the Impact of 100 percent DFQF Market Access for OECD Countries? 
The overall conclusion regarding the impact on preference-giving countries—both developed 
and developing—is that it is small. Annex Table 3 shows the results from the CGE model for 
changes in exports, GDP, and welfare, among other indicators, and they are indistinguishable 
from zero for all preference-giving countries when 100 percent DFQF for LDCs is given, either by 
the OECD only, or OECD plus Brazil, China, and India. Table 5 shows the sector-specific variation 
in production for preference-giving countries and, while the impact often exceeds the average, 
economy-wide impact (not surprisingly),there is only a handful of cases where  production 
declines rise to even as much as 0.5 percent. 
For the OECD countries not already granting 100 percent product coverage, the most sensitive 
products are often agricultural products subject to tariff-rate quotas to help control supply and 
prop up prices. The expressed concern, whether in Japan for rice and dairy, Canada for dairy 
and poultry, or sugar in the United States, is that expanded market access for LDCs will 
destabilize the price support programs. It is true, that the estimated reductions for agricultural 
products that are commonly controlled through quantitative restrictions could be suppressed 
because the model cannot completely address the prospects for trade creation in cases where 
little or no trade currently exists. Still, one would not expect large gains for potential LDC 
exporters of commodities such as meat and dairy products because it would be difficult for 
poor countries to meet rich-country food safety standards for these products.  And in other 
sectors, the prospects for significant supply expansion are limited.
 
To explore one example in more detail, are the CGE results in Table 6 and Annex Table 5, which 
show very little change in either exports or U.S. production of sugar from providing 100 percent 
DFQF for LDCs, plausible? While the estimate of no change in production is influenced by the 
restrictions imposed on trade creation in cases of zero trade, a brief survey of LDC exporters 
and markets also suggests there is little reason to expect a large surge in U.S. imports if sugar is 
included in DFQF for LDCs. Currently, only two African LDCs—Malawi and Mozambique—have 
access to the U.S. market under the historical quota allocation system and their quotas are 
small. Only two other African LDCs—Ethiopia and Zambia—have had exportable sugar surpluses 
in recent years. But African sugar producers tend to be relatively high-cost and transportation 
costs are also high.
25
  
 The European Union is also the traditional market for African exporters, 
though some of those exports could shift to the American market since the reform of the EU 
sugar regime (forced by a WTO complaint by Brazil) reduced the internal price from 50 percent 
higher to roughly the same level as in the United States. 
                                                           
25 The exception to this is Sudan, which is planning large investments in sugar production with the aim of boosting 
output ten-fold. But Sudan is currently excluded from U.S. preference programs and the U.S. market by 
comprehensive foreign policy sanctions over human rights and democracy issues. Table 6: Percentage Change in Production Volume from implementing 100% DFQF for LDCs* 
Sector  ANZ  Canada  EFTA  EU  Japan  Mexico  Turkey  US  Brazil  China  India 
Fish  -0,01   -0,01   0,00   0,00   -0,01   0,00   -0,00   0,00   0,00   -0,01   -0,10  
Leatherproducts  0,02   -0,01   0,02   0,00   0,02   0,01   0,09   0,05   -0,08   -0,01   0,47  
Milk  -0,05   -0,03   -0,01   -0,01   -0,01   0,01   0,02   -0,10   -0,00   0,01   -0,00  
Oilseeds  -0,97   -0,57   0,48   -0,17   -0,38   -0,45   -1,56   -0,99   -0,41   -0,33   -0,07  
Othercereal grains  0,04   -0,06   -0,01   -0,00   -0,01   0,01   -0,12   0,04   0,17   0,01   0,05  
Othercrops  0,02   -0,40   0,14   0,03   -0,03   -0,14   -0,66   -0,76   -0,05   -0,03   -0,14  
Rice  0,03   0,09   0,29   0,13   -0,00   -0,00   -0,32   0,04   0,00   0,00   0,10  
Sugar  -0,15   0,01   -0,54   0,21   -0,35   0,01   0,06   0,01   0,15   -0,17   0,03  
Textile  -0,27   -0,57   0,05   0,07   -0,03   -0,22   0,08   -0,45   -0,09   -0,11   0,21  
Vegetable and fruit  0,04   0,05   -0,00   0,00   0,01   0,00   0,06   0,03   0,01   0,00   -0,62  
Vegetableoils and fats  -0,51   -0,91   -1,36   -0,24   -0,27   -0,07   0,03   0,02   -0,50   -0,46   -0,20  
Wearingapparel  -0,10   -0,01   0,02   0,03   -0,00   -0,03   0,03   -0,13   -0,06   -0,21   0,41  
 
*For OECD countries, when only they implement; for emerging markets, when they implement along with OECD. To explore further the potential for market disruption from increased African sugar exports, we 
applied a simple partial equilibrium analysis to this sector. Table 7  shows the impact on 
domestic production and prices from two scenarios, one where U.S. imports of sugar increase 
by 100,000 short tons, which would have almost no impact on U.S. prices and production, and a 
second with increased imports of 300,000 short tons, which would reduce production by 6 
percent and average prices by 10 percent, to 20 cents per pound.
26
Another sensitive sector for the United States is apparel and, here, both the CGE and partial 
equilibrium (Table 2 and Annex Table 5) results do show relatively large increases in apparel 
exports by Bangladesh and Southeast Asia (mostly by Cambodia). But, again, the impact on U.S. 
production is small, -0.45 percent for textiles and -0.13 for clothing. If removal of tariffs led to 
increased imports that are two to three times higher than estimated in the CGE model, closer 
to what is suggested by the partial equilibrium model (Table 1), and if the impact on production 
is proportional, it would still be in a range of one to two percent.
  Though there is no 
economic justification for the U.S. price-support program for sugar, these estimates suggest 
that at least some expansion of access is possible, without major disruption of the market, as 
long as that remains the political goal of the minority that controls policy. 
27
                                                           
26 The estimates were done using the partial equilibrium model in Hufbauer and Elliott (1994). 
27 The estimated 4 percent increase in Bangladeshi exports from the CGE model, shown in Table 1 is for all exports 
to all countries. As shown in Annex Table 4, the increase in exports of textiles and clothing, most of which would be 
to the United States, is nearly 13 percent. The partial equilibrium estimates of increased exports are a bit more 
than twice that figure for Bangladesh and roughly 50 percent higher for Cambodia. 
 
There are two major reasons for the relatively limited impact on U.S. production. First, the 
increase in imports from the Asian LDCs is offset to some extent by small decreases in exports 
spread among a large number of other exporters. Secondly, LDCs tend not to compete in the 
same product lines as American producers, who are generally far more technology 
sophisticated and capital-intensive. This is illustrated by the fact that Bangladesh’s apparel 










Table 7: Effects of enlarging the U.S. Sugar Quota 
Estimated levels after altering quota  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  
 
     
New Import Price (calculated, dollars/short ton)  414.3                          376.1  
New Import Volume (assumed, '000 short tons)  1,500.0                      1,700.0  
New Domestic Price (calculated, dollars/short ton)  421.6                          395.0  
New Domestic Output (calculated, '000 short tons)  8,318.9                      8,000.1  
  
 
     




  Import Price (dollars/short ton) 
 
437.0  
  Import Volume (WTO quota level, '000 short tons)  1,400.0  
  Domestic Price (dollars/short ton) 
 
437.0  
  Domestic Output ('000 short tons) 
 
8,500.0  
    
 
  
  Elasticities and intercepts used for calculations (see 
Hufbauer and Elliott) 
  
    
    
 
  
  (i) DomesticDemand 
 
  
  Own-Price Elasticity (Edd) 
 
  
     Cross-Price Elasticity (Edm) 
 
-1.33  
    
 
1.30  
   (ii) DomesticSupply 
 
  
  Own-Price Elasticity (Es) 
 
  
    
 
0.60  
   (iii) Import Demand 
 
  
  Own-Price Elasticity (Emm) 
 
  
     Cross-Price Elasticity (Emd) 
 
-3.78  
    
 
3.69  
   (iv) Equation Intercepts 
 
  
    ln(a) 
 
  
    ln(b) 
 
9.23  
    ln(c) 
 
5.40  
        7.79  
  Source for model and parameters: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliott,  
Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States,Washington: Institute for  
International Economics, 1994, p. 81 
 
Source for data: U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Sugar and Sweeteners:  




Unilateral trade preference programs were created four decades ago to stimulate exports and 
help developing countries diversify their economies as part of their development strategies. 
Through preferences, but also regional and multilateral negotiations, many developing 
countries succeeded spectacularly in using trade as a tool of development, but the least 
developed countries lagged for a variety of reasons. The duty-free, quota-free market access 
initiative was developed to give these countries a boost.  
While significant progress has been made toward the goal of improved market access for LDCs 
since the Millennium Declaration embraced it in 2000, much also remains to be done. This 
analysis helps to identify the distribution of potential costs and benefits from further progress. 
Several key conclusions that should inform policies in G20 countries stand out: 
-  There are still significant benefits for LDCs from removing the remaining barriers they 
face in OECD countries, but only if all products are covered.  Since both rich-country 
tariff peaks and LDC exports are relatively concentrated, excluding as few as three 
percent of tariff lines, as proposed by the United States at the WTO ministerial meeting 
in Hong Kong in 2005, reduces the benefits to basically zero. 
-  Although it has nearly full access in its main markets, including in the United States 
under AGOA, sub-Saharan Africa can still gain from 100 percent DFQF market access 
that eliminates remaining agricultural restrictions in the U.S. markets. 
-  The gains for LDCs, especially in Africa, are significantly enhanced if Brazil, China, and 
India also provide 100 percent DFQF market access. 
-  There is little evidence of significant losses for other competing developing countries 
that are not LDCs, including Pakistan or Sri Lanka, nor is there evidence of net losses for 
Africa from the United States extending DFQF market access to Asian LDCs. 
-  The LDCs account for a trivial share of global exports, the reason for the initiative, and 
preference-giving countries thus have little to fear from extending full market access to 
them. The quantitative results show that the expected impact on welfare, exports, and 
domestic production are very small to zero, including for the quota-controlled 
agricultural products excluded by Canada, Japan, and the United States, as well as 
textiles and apparel in the latter case. 
-  Relative to the scenario where only the OECD does so, the large emerging markets do 
better if they also grant 100 percent DFQF market access to LDCs.  
 
-  Extending DFQF access to other low-income countries (by the World Bank definition) has 
little impact on existing LDC beneficiaries or preference-giving countries, but big 
benefits for Pakistan and Vietnam if they are included.
28
-  Extending DFQF to other small and poor (lower middle-income) countries has large 
benefits in some cases for those countries, but at the expense of existing LDC 
beneficiaries, especially in Africa, and also entails higher costs for preference-giving 
countries. 
 
The context around these potential gains is also important, however. In particular, they assume 
full utilization of available market access, but that does not happen for a number of reasons. It 
did not happen under the EU’s Everything But Arms program in the past because of rules of 
origin that are highly restrictive in some sectors and prevent LDC exporters being able to take 
advantage. The value of U.S. and other reforms in the future will also depend on what kind of 
rules they choose to implement.  
Whether African fish and clothing exports respond to the change in EU rules of origin will tell us 
something about the importance of complementary policies to support full utilization of 
preference programs.  We know that policies outside preference programs themselves, such as 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards
29
                                                           
28 Note, however, that Pakistan recently moved into the World Bank’s low-middle income category and Vietnam is 
expected to do so, possibly as soon as this year. 
29 Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2004)  analyze the impact of sanitary and phyto-sanitary 5SPS) rules, as well as 
technical barriers to trade(TBT). They show that SPS and TBT have a significant impact on LDCs exports  especially 
from the EU market. Actually they’ve shown that despite the fact that other OECD countries enforce more SPS 
rules, those imposed by the EU impede more LDCs exports on agricultural products. Obviously these SPS and TBT 
rules are often legitimate, but they can also be protectionist. 
 affect agricultural trade in importing countries, and 
that inadequate infrastructure and excessive red tape in LDCs, are often at least as important as 
traditional border measures in suppressing LDC exports. Aid for trade and reforms to improve 
investment climates in the exporting countries need to be addressed  before preference 
programs can reach their full potential. 
But providing market access is a step that this analysis suggests would be both beneficial for 
LDCs, and low-cost for preference-giving countries. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon just 
designated 2010 as the “year of development” and called for accelerated efforts to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. The ongoing economic crisis in many rich countries 
contributed to rising protectionist pressures in those countries and could make this proposal 
seem less feasible. But the analysis  here underscores the small effects on production in 
preference-giving countries and the crisis should not be an excuse for delaying achievement of 
the goal of providing duty-free, quota-free market access for LDCs by rich countries, as well as 




Annex Table 1: Regions and Sectors Used in the Model 
Regions  Sectors 
Australia New Zealand  Agrofood (aggregate) 
Bangladesh*  Animal and meatproducts 
Bolivia**  Beverage and tobaccoproducts 
Brazil  Chemicalrubber plastic products 
Canada  Coal oilgas 
Central America***  Cotton woolsilkforestry 
China  Fish 
EFTA  Industry (aggregate) 
Ethiopia*  Leatherproducts 
EU  Metals 
India  Milk 
Indonesia  Oilseeds 
Japan  Othercereal grains 
Korea South  Other crops (includes raw tobacco) 
Madagascar*  Otherfoodproducts 
Malawi*  Othermanufacturedproducts 
Mauritius  Otherminerals 
Mexico  Other services 
Middle East and North Africa  Rice 
Mozambique* ;  Services 
Nigeria  Sugar 
Oil exporting countries  Textile 
Pakistan  Trade 
Paraguay**  Transport 
Philippines  Vegetable and fruit 
Rest of Africa***  Vegetableoils and fats 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  Wearingapparel 
Rest of Eastern Europe  Wheat 
Rest of Latin America***    
Rest of South East Asia*    
Senegal*    
South Africa    
Sri Lanka**    
Turkey    
US    
Vietnam    
* Least developed countries 
** Other small and poor countries 
*** Region includes LDCs and/or other small and poor countries Annex Table 2: List of sensitive products at the HS6 level, defined from the model of Jean and al. (2010) 
(the first 35 products are reported) 
The United States  The European Union  Canada 
hs6  excluded products  hs6  excluded products  hs6  excluded products 
240120  TOBACCO  PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED OR STR  010111  PURE BRED BREEDING HORSES  040510  BUTTER  EXCL. DEHYDRATED BUTTER AND GHEE 
620520  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF COTTON  EXCL. K  010119  LIVE HORSES  EXCL. PURE BRED FOR BREEDIN  040690  CHEESE  EXCL. FRESH CHEESE  INCL. WHEY C 
240110  TOBACCO  NOT STEMMED OR STRIPPED  010210  PURE BRED BREEDING BOVINES  020714  FROZEN CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL OF FOWLS OF 
611020  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  010290  LIVE BOVINE ANIMALS  EXCL. PURE BRED FOR  180690  CHOCOLATE AND othr PREPARATIONS CONTAIN 
611030  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  010310  PURE BRED BREEDING SWINE  190190  PREPARATIONS OF FLOUR  MEAL  STARCH OR M 
610910  T SHIRTS  SINGLETS AND othr VESTS OF CO  010391  LIVE PURE BRED SWINE  WEIGHING inf  50 KG  230990  PREPARATIONS OF A KIND USED IN ANIMAL FE 
610510  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF COTTON  KNITTED  010392  LIVE PURE BRED SWINE  WEIGHING sup 50 KG  190120  MIXES AND DOUGHS  OF FLOUR  MEAL  STARCH 
620193  MEN`S OR BOYS` ANORAKS  INCL. SKI JACKET  010410  LIVE SHEEP  210690  FOOD PREPARATIONS N.E.S. 
170199  CANE OR BEET SUGAR AND CHEMICALLY PURE S  010420  LIVE GOATS  611780  MADE UP CLOTHING ACCESSORIES  KNITTED OR 
620342  MEN`S OR BOYS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRACE O  010511  LIVE FOWLS OF SPECIES GALLUS DOMESTICUS  650590  HATS AND othr HEADGEAR  KNITTED OR CROC 
610610  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  010512  LIVE DOMESTIC TURKEYS  WEIGHING inf = 185 G  040110  MILK AND CREAM OF A FAT CONTENT BY WEIGH 
620530  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF MAN MADE FIBRES  010519  LIVE DOMESTIC DUCKS  GEESE  TURKEYS AND  821192  KNIVES WITH FIXED BLADES OF BASE METAL 
610343  MEN`S OR BOYS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRACE O  010592  LIVE FOWLS OF THE SPECIES GALLUS DOMESTI  850680  PRIMARY CELLS AND PRIMARY BATTERIES  ELE 
620343  MEN`S OR BOYS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRACE O  010593  LIVE FOWLS OF THE SPECIES GALLUS DOMESTI  020713  FRESH OR CHILLED CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL O 
620293  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` ANORAKS  INCL. SKI JAC  010599  LIVE DOMESTIC DUCKS  GEESE  TURKEYS AND  160232  PREPARED OR PRESERVED MEAT OR MEAT OFFAL 
230990  PREPARATIONS OF A KIND USED IN ANIMAL FE  010600  LIVE ANIMALS  EXCL. HORSES  ASSES  MULES  020726  FRESH OR CHILLED CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL O 
610832  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` NIGHTDRESSES AND PYJAM  020110  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CARCASES AND HAL  020727  FROZEN CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL OF TURKEYS 
620630  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  020120  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CUTS  UNBONED  E  020711  FRESH OR CHILLED FOWLS OF THE SPECIES GA 
611241  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` SWIMWEAR OF SYNTHETIC  020130  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE MEAT  BONELESS  020712  FROZEN FOWLS OF THE SPECIES GALLUS DOMES 
620640  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  020220  FROZEN BOVINE CUTS  UNBONED  EXCL. CARCA  020725  FROZEN TURKEYS OF THE SPECIES DOMESTICUS 
610620  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  020230  BONELESS  FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS  160231  PREPARED OR PRESERVED MEAT OR OFFAL OF T 
610520  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF MAN MADE FIBRES  020312  FRESH OR CHILLED HAMS  SHOULDERS AND CUT  020900  PIG FAT  FREE OF LEAN MEAT AND POULTRY F 
621111  MEN`S OR BOYS` SWIMWEAR  EXCL. KNITTED O  020319  FRESH OR CHILLED MEAT OF SWINE  EXCL. CA  160220  PREPARATIONS OF LIVER OF ANY ANIMAL  EXC 
611130  BABIES` GARMENTS AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIE  020322  FROZEN HAMS  SHOULDERS AND CUTS THEREOF  160100  SAUSAGES AND SIMILAR PRODUCTS  OF MEAT 
620920  BABIES` GARMENTS AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIE  020329  FROZEN MEAT OF SWINE  EXCL. CARCASES AND  021090  MEAT AND EDIBLE OFFAL  SALTED  IN BRINE 
610469  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRAC  020410  FRESH OR CHILLED LAMB CARCASES AND 1/2 C  010111  PURE BRED BREEDING HORSES 
620413  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` SUITS OF SYNTHETIC FIB  020421  FRESH OR CHILLED SHEEP CARCASES AND 1/2  010600  LIVE ANIMALS  EXCL. HORSES  ASSES  MULES 
620452  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` SKIRTS AND DIVIDED SKI  020422  FRESH OR CHILLED CUTS OF SHEEP  UNBONED  020110  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CARCASES AND HAL 
610722  MEN`S OR BOYS` NIGHTSHIRTS AND PYJAMAS O  020423  FRESH OR CHILLED BONELESS CUTS OF SHEEP  020120  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CUTS  UNBONED  E 
620930  BABIES` GARMENTS AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIE  020430  FROZEN LAMB CARCASES AND 1/2 CARCASES  020130  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE MEAT  BONELESS 
620822  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` NIGHTDRESSES AND PYJAM  020441  FROZEN SHEEP CARCASES AND 1/2 CARCASES  020210  FROZEN BOVINE CARCASES AND 1/2 CARCASES 
611120  BABIES` GARMENTS AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIE  020442  FROZEN CUTS OF SHEEP  UNBONED  EXCL. CAR  020220  FROZEN BOVINE CUTS  UNBONED  EXCL. CARCA 
620463  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRAC  020443  FROZEN BONED CUTS OF SHEEP  020230  BONELESS  FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS 
620453  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` SKIRTS AND DIVIDED SKI  020450  FRESH  CHILLED OR FROZEN MEAT OF GOATS  020311  FRESH OR CHILLED CARCASES AND 1/2 CARCAS 
610463  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRAC  020500  MEAT OF HORSES  ASSES  MULES OR HINNIES  020312  FRESH OR CHILLED HAMS  SHOULDERS AND CUT 
  
 
Annex Table 2 (continued): List of sensitive products at the HS6 level, defined from the model of Jean and al. (2010) 
(the first 35 products are reported) 
Japan  Brazil  China 
hs6  excluded products  hs6  excluded products  hs6  excluded products 
170199  CANE OR BEET SUGAR AND CHEMICALLY PURE S  520100  COTTON  NEITHER CARDED NOR COMBED  271000  PETROLEUM OILS AND OILS OBTAINED FROM BI 
100630  SEMI MILLED OR WHOLLY MILLED RICE  240120  TOBACCO  PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED OR STR  081340  DRIED PEACHES  PEARS  PAWPAWS  TAMARINDS 
030490  FROZEN FISH MEAT  WHETHER OR NOT MINCED  750210  NICKEL  NOT ALLOYED  UNWROUGHT  151790  EDIBLE MIXTURES OR PREPARATIONS OF ANIMA 
420310  ITEMS OF CLOTHING  OF LEATHER OR COMPOSI  520300  COTTON  CARDED OR COMBED  400122  TECHNICALLY SPECIFIED NATURAL RUBBER `TS 
640110  WATERPROOF FOOTWEAR INCORPORATING A PROT  410431  FULL GRAINS AND GRAIN SPLITS OF BOVINE A  400121  SMOKED SHEETS OF NATURAL RUBBER 
640610  UPPERS AND PARTS THEREOF  EXCL. STIFFENE  300390 
MEDICAMENTS CONSISTING OF TWO OR MORE 
CO  151620  VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR FRACTI 
030510  FISH MEAL FIT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION  410620  GOAT OR KIDSKIN LEATHER  DEHAIRED  PREPA  151590  FIXED VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR 
030410  FRESH OR CHILLED FILLETS AND othr FISH  620530  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF MAN MADE FIBRES  281820  ALUMINIUM OXIDE  EXCL. ARTIFICIAL CORUND 
640699  PARTS OF FOOTWEAR  EXCL. OUTER SOLES AND  300490  MEDICAMENTS CONSISTING OF MIXED OR UNMIX  510529  WOOL  COMBED  EXCL. THAT IN FRAGMENTS `O 
420340  CLOTHING ACCESSORIES OF LEATHER OR COMPO  530310  JUTE AND othr TEXTILE BAST FIBRES  RAW  852290  PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF SOUND REPRODUCI 
030374  FROZEN MACKEREL `SCOMBER SCOMBRUS  SCOMB  847160  INPUT OR OUTPUT UNITS FOR DIGITAL AUTOMA  121299  FRUIT STONES AND KERNELS AND othr VEGET 
640192  WATERPROOF FOOTWEAR COVERING THE ANKLE  851790  PARTS OF ELECTRICAL APPARATUS FOR LINE T  030379  FROZEN FRESHWATER AND SALTWATER FISH  EX 
640191  WATERPROOF FOOTWEAR COVERING THE KNEE  W  611020  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  400129  NATURAL RUBBER IN PRIMARY FORMS OR IN PL 
030729  SCALLOPS  INCL. QUEEN SCALLOPS  OF THE G  410439  BOVINE AND EQUINE LEATHER  DEHAIRED  PRE  870324  MOTOR CARS AND othr MOTOR VEHICLES PRIN 
640620  OUTER SOLES AND HEELS  OF RUBBER OR PLAS  530720  MULTIPLE `FOLDED` OR CABLED YARN OF JUTE  190490  CEREALS IN GRAIN FORM  PRE COOKED OR OTH 
420330  BELTS  WAISTBELTS AND SHOULDER BELTS  OF  410520  SHEEP OR LAMBSKIN LEATHER  WITHOUT WOOL  271113  BUTANES  LIQUEFIED  EXCL. OF A PURITY OF 
420321  SPECIAL SPORTS GLOVES  OF LEATHER OR COM  030375  FROZEN DOGFISH AND othr SHARKS  120740  SESAMUM SEEDS  WHETHER OR NOT BROKEN 
640199  WATERPROOF FOOTWEAR COVERING NEITHER THE  611030  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  271119  GASEOUS HYDROCARBONS  LIQUEFIED N.E.S. 
100610  RICE IN THE HUSK  `PADDY` OR ROUGH  410429  BOVINE AND EQUINE LEATHER  DEHAIRED  TAN  400700  VULCANIZED RUBBER THREAD AND CORD  EXCL. 
100620  HUSKED OR BROWN RICE  610729  MEN`S OR BOYS` NIGHTSHIRTS AND PYJAMAS O  190211  UNCOOKED PASTA  NOT STUFFED OR othrWISE 
170191  REFINED CANE OR BEET SUGAR  CONTAINING A  240110  TOBACCO  NOT STEMMED OR STRIPPED  200919  ORANGE JUICE  WHETHER OR NOT CONTAINING 
170112  RAW BEET SUGAR  EXCL. ADDED FLAVOURING O  170199  CANE OR BEET SUGAR AND CHEMICALLY PURE S  030559  DRIED FISH  SALTED  NOT SMOKED  EXCL. CO 
010310  PURE BRED BREEDING SWINE  410612  GOAT OR KIDSKIN LEATHER  DEHAIRED  MINER  330129  ESSENTIAL OILS  WHETHER OR NOT TERPENELE 
010410  LIVE SHEEP  392530  SHUTTERS  BLINDS  INCL. VENETIAN BLINDS  842649  MOBILE CRANES AND WORKS TRUCKS FITTED WI 
010420  LIVE GOATS  610910  T SHIRTS  SINGLETS AND othr VESTS OF CO  151710  MARGARINE  EXCL. LIQUID 
010519  LIVE DOMESTIC DUCKS  GEESE  TURKEYS AND  300320  MEDICAMENTS CONTAINING ANTIBIOTICS  NOT  810510  COBALT MATTES AND othr INTERMEDIATE PRO 
010599  LIVE DOMESTIC DUCKS  GEESE  TURKEYS AND  620113  MEN`S OR BOYS` OVERCOATS  RAINCOATS  CAR  051191  PRODUCTS OF FISH OR CRUSTACEANS  MOLLUSC 
010600  LIVE ANIMALS  EXCL. HORSES  ASSES  MULES  610510  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF COTTON  KNITTED  410512  SHEEP OR LAMBSKIN LEATHER  WITHOUT WOOL 
020110  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CARCASES AND HAL  640419  FOOTWEAR WITH OUTER SOLES OF RUBBER OR P  281830  ALUMINIUM HYDROXIDE 
020120  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CUTS  UNBONED  E  620462  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRAC  510130 
CARBONIZED WOOL  NEITHER CARDED NOR 
COMB 
020130  FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE MEAT  BONELESS  610349  MEN`S OR BOYS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRACE O  240220  CIGARETTES CONTAINING TOBACCO 
020210  FROZEN BOVINE CARCASES AND 1/2 CARCASES  611212  TRACK SUITS OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES  KNITTED  030329  FROZEN SALMONIDAE  EXCL. PACIFIC SALMON 
020220  FROZEN BOVINE CUTS  UNBONED  EXCL. CARCA  590220  TYRE CORD FABRIC OF HIGH TENSILE POLYEST  070490  FRESH OR CHILLED CABBAGES  KOHLRABI  KAL 
  
 
Annex Table 2 (continued): List of sensitive products at the HS6 level, defined from the model of Jean and al. (2010) 
(the first 35 products are reported) 
India  Mexico  Turkey 
hs6  excluded products  hs6  excluded products  hs6  excluded products 
080131  FRESH OR DRIED CASHEW NUTS  IN SHELL  240120  TOBACCO  PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED OR STR  170111  RAW CANE SUGAR  EXCL. ADDED FLAVOURING O 
080620  DRIED GRAPES  240110  TOBACCO  NOT STEMMED OR STRIPPED  240120  TOBACCO  PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED OR STR 
071390  DRIED  SHELLED LEGUMINOUS VEGETABLES  WH  611030  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  120740  SESAMUM SEEDS  WHETHER OR NOT BROKEN 
270900  PETROLEUM OILS AND OILS OBTAINED FROM BI  620520  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF COTTON  EXCL. K  090240  BLACK FERMENTED TEA AND PARTLY FERMENTED 
071310  DRIED  SHELLED PEAS `PISUM SATIVUM`  WHE  620342  MEN`S OR BOYS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRACE O  170310  CANE MOLASSES RESULTING FROM THE EXTRACT 
280920  PHOSPHORIC ACID AND POLYPHOSPHORIC ACIDS  610910  T SHIRTS  SINGLETS AND othr VESTS OF CO  240110  TOBACCO  NOT STEMMED OR STRIPPED 
080290  NUTS  FRESH OR DRIED  WHETHER OR NOT SHE  121299  FRUIT STONES AND KERNELS AND othr VEGET  100890  CEREALS  EXCL. WHEAT AND MESLIN  RYE  BA 
071339  DRIED  SHELLED BEANS `VIGNA AND PHASEOLU  620462  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRAC  080232  FRESH OR DRIED WALNUTS  SHELLED AND PEEL 
071331  DRIED  SHELLED BEANS OF SPECIES `VIGNA M  630622  TENTS OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES  EXCL. FLY SHE  240130  TOBACCO REFUSE 
090111  COFFEE  EXCL. ROASTED AND DECAFFEINATED  620630  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  151229  COTTON SEED OIL AND ITS FRACTIONS  WHETH 
071320  DRIED  SHELLED CHICKPEAS  WHETHER OR NOT  121190  PLANTS  PARTS OF PLANTS  SEEDS AND FRUIT  200570  OLIVES  PREPARED OR PRESERVED othrWISE 
890120  TANKERS  650590  HATS AND othr HEADGEAR  KNITTED OR CROC  120720  COTTON SEEDS  WHETHER OR NOT BROKEN 
720449  WASTE AND SCRAP OF IRON OR STEEL `ECSC`  030343  FROZEN SKIPJACK OR STRIPE BELLIED BONITO  090930  CUMIN SEEDS 
090240  BLACK FERMENTED TEA AND PARTLY FERMENTED  611020  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  200799  JAMS  JELLIES  MARMALADES  PUREES OR PAS 
170111  RAW CANE SUGAR  EXCL. ADDED FLAVOURING O  620193  MEN`S OR BOYS` ANORAKS  INCL. SKI JACKET  121190  PLANTS  PARTS OF PLANTS  SEEDS AND FRUIT 
130190  NATURAL GUMS  RESINS  GUM RESINS AND BAL  610510  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF COTTON  KNITTED  100590  MAIZE  EXCL. SEED 
151110  CRUDE PALM OIL  030420  FROZEN FISH FILLETS  091099  SPICES N.E.S.  EXCL. MIXTURES OF DIFFERE 
710310  PRECIOUS STONES AND SEMI PRECIOUS STONES  621133  MEN`S OR BOYS` TRACK SUITS AND othr GAR  090700  CLOVES  WHOLE FRUIT  CLOVES AND STEMS 
270799  OILS AND othr PRODUCTS OF THE DISTILLAT  620343  MEN`S OR BOYS` TROUSERS  BIB AND BRACE O  091010  GINGER 
080250  FRESH OR DRIED PISTACHIOS  WHETHER OR NO  611010  JERSEYS  PULLOVERS  CARDIGANS  WAISTCOAT  200811  GROUND NUTS  PREPARED OR PRESERVED N.E.S 
151620  VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR FRACTI  620113  MEN`S OR BOYS` OVERCOATS  RAINCOATS  CAR  050400  GUTS  BLADDERS AND STOMACHS OF ANIMALS O 
151190  PALM OIL AND ITS FRACTIONS  WHETHER OR N  030342  FROZEN YELLOWFIN TUNAS  080290  NUTS  FRESH OR DRIED  WHETHER OR NOT SHE 
151590  FIXED VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR  620293  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` ANORAKS  INCL. SKI JAC  121299  FRUIT STONES AND KERNELS AND othr VEGET 
080212  FRESH OR DRIED ALMONDS  SHELLED AND PEEL  621111  MEN`S OR BOYS` SWIMWEAR  EXCL. KNITTED O  200580  SWEETCORN `ZEA MAYS VAR. SACCHARATA`  PR 
090700  CLOVES  WHOLE FRUIT  CLOVES AND STEMS  620530  MEN`S OR BOYS` SHIRTS OF MAN MADE FIBRES  200899  FRUIT  NUTS AND othr EDIBLE PARTS OF PL 
071333  DRIED  SHELLED KIDNEY BEANS `PHASEOLUS V  610130  OVERCOATS  CAR COATS  CAPES  CLOAKS  ANO  210690  FOOD PREPARATIONS N.E.S. 
080420  FRESH OR DRIED FIGS  620213  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` OVERCOATS  RAINCOATS  090610  CINNAMON AND CINNAMON TREE FLOWERS  EXCL 
870323  MOTOR CARS AND othr MOTOR VEHICLES PRIN  611420  SPECIAL GARMENTS FOR PROFESSIONAL  SPORT  091030  TURMERIC `CURCUMA` 
080132  FRESH OR DRIED CASHEW NUTS  SHELLED  610610  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  081090  KIWIFRUIT  TAMARINDS  CASHEW APPLES  JAC 
081310  DRIED APRICOTS  030759  OCTOPUS `OCTOPUS SPP.`  FROZEN  DRIED  S  090111  COFFEE  EXCL. ROASTED AND DECAFFEINATED 
520100  COTTON  NEITHER CARDED NOR COMBED  160590  MOLLUSCS AND AQUATIC INVERTEBRATES  PREP  120760  SAFFLOWER SEEDS  WHETHER OR NOT BROKEN 
440349  TROPICAL WOOD SPECIFIED IN THE SUBHEADIN  621210  BRASSIERES OF ALL TYPES OF TEXTILE MATER  071320  DRIED  SHELLED CHICKPEAS  WHETHER OR NOT 
870390  MOTOR CARS AND othr VEHICLES PRINCIPALL  610729  MEN`S OR BOYS` NIGHTSHIRTS AND PYJAMAS O  080620  DRIED GRAPES 
090230  BLACK FERMENTED TEA AND PARTLY FERMENTED  620690  WOMEN`S OR GIRLS` BLOUSES  SHIRTS AND SH  081310  DRIED APRICOTS 
  
 
Annex Table 3: Percentage Change in Total Export Value in 2020 in Selected DFQF Scenarios 
(see text for scenario definitions) 
 
Region 
97% to LDC from 
OECD markets (A) 
100% to LDC from OECD 
markets (B) 
100% to LDC and SVE from 
OECD markets (C) 
100% to LDC from OECD 
markets + Emerging (D) 
Additionnal scenario 
with LICs 
ANZ  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.04 
Bangladesh  0.06  4.16  3.46  4.82  3.38 
Bolivia  0.00  -0.03  3.46  -0.04  -0.02 
Brazil  0.00  -0.03  -0.12  0.00  -0.07 
Canada  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.02 
C Am  0.00  0.14  0.83  0.14  -0.02 
China  0.00  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.10 
EFTA  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.08 
Ethiopia  0.02  1.35  -0.49  2.24  0.90 
EU  0.00  -0.01  0.32  -0.01  0.12 
India  0.00  -0.01  -0.04  0.64  0.04 
Indonesia  0.00  -0.03  -0.07  -0.03  0.02 
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.49 
Korea South  0.00  -0.09  -0.07  -0.09  0.41 
Madagascar  0.01  -0.03  -2.28  0.57  -0.70 
Malawi  0.01  12.97  4.71  13.91  11.15 
Mauritius  0.00  0.03  -1.96  0.05  -0.35 
Mexico  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
MENA  0.00  0.01  3.51  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.39  -0.48  1.41  0.21 
Nigeria  0.00  0.01  0.03  -0.13  0.03 
Oil Xers  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.03 
Pakistan  0.00  -0.04  -0.05  -0.06  11.90 
Paraguay  0.00  -0.04  16.95  -0.03  -0.03 
Philippines  0.00  -0.01  -0.07  -0.02  -0.17 
Rest of Africa  0.00  0.08  0.49  0.22  0.29 
Rest of AO  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.08 
Rest of EE  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.01  0.10 
Rest of LA  0.00  -0.05  0.78  -0.04  -0.07 
Rest of SEA  0.05  2.52  2.40  2.55  2.25 
Senegal  0.00  1.16  0.80  9.38  1.12 
South Africa  0.00  0.02  -0.02  0.03  0.04 
Sri Lanka  0.00  -0.01  20.94  -0.05  -0.27 
Turkey  0.00  0.04  0.92  0.04  0.30 
US  0.00  0.03  0.13  0.04  0.04 
Vietnam  0.00  -0.01  -0.06  -0.01  18.00 Annex Table 4: Percentage Change in Economy-Wide Variables in 2020 from Implementing 100 percent DFQF for LDCs 
 
 
Value of exports  GDP (volume)  Real effective XR  Terms of trade  Welfare 
Region 
OECD 
only  WithEMs  OECD only  WithEMs  OECD only  WithEMs  OECD only  WithEMs  OECD only  WithEMs 
Australia New Zealand  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Bangladesh  4.16  4.82  0.17  0.24  0.97  1.15  0.86  1.02  0.29  0.37 
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
Brazil  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
Canada  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Central America  0.14  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01 
China  -0.03  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 
EFTA  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ethiopia  1.35  2.24  0.21  0.31  0.52  0.78  0.52  0.81  0.29  0.43 
EU  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
India  -0.01  0.64  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.17  -0.01  -0.14  0.00  -0.03 
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Korea South  -0.09  -0.09  0.04  0.04  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.11 
Madagascar  -0.03  0.57  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.26  -0.02  0.22  -0.02  0.14 
Malawi  12.97  13.91  1.21  1.40  3.80  4.26  3.98  4.44  2.65  2.99 
Mauritius  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Mexico  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Middle East and North Africa  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.39  1.41  0.15  0.41  0.17  0.67  0.17  0.61  0.17  0.52 
Nigeria  0.01  -0.13  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.08  0.00  -0.11 
Oilexporting countries  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pakistan  -0.04  -0.06  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01 
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
Philippines  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.22  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.11  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.08 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
Rest of South East Asia  2.52  2.55  0.42  0.43  0.77  0.79  0.52  0.53  0.95  0.97 
Senegal  1.16  9.38  0.15  0.92  0.31  2.52  0.26  2.35  0.15  1.13 
South Africa  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sri Lanka  -0.01  -0.05  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 
Turkey  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
US  0.03  0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00 
Vietnam  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
XR = exchange rate; Ems = emerging markets (Brazil, China, India)Annex Table 4 (continued): Percentage Change in Economy-Wide Variables in 2020 from 
Implementing 100 percent DFQF for LDCs 
 
Regions  Import Variation (%)  Added Value(%) 
Australia New Zealand  0.00  0.00 
Bangladesh  3.48  0.14 
Bolivia  -0.03  -0.00 
Brazil  -0.04  -0.00 
Canada  -0.01  -0.00 
Central America  0.11  0.00 
China  -0.02  -0.00 
EFTA  0.01  0.00 
Ethiopia  0.84  0.22 
EU  0.00  0.00 
India  -0.01  -0.00 
Indonesia  -0.03  -0.00 
Japan  0.00  -0.00 
Korea South  -0.09  0.13 
Madagascar  -0.03  -0.00 
Malawi  8.96  1.71 
Mauritius  0.02  0.00 
Mexico  0.00  0.00 
Middle East and North Africa  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.35  0.14 
Nigeria  0.00  0.00 
Oilexporting countries  0.00  -0.00 
Pakistan  -0.02  -0.00 
Paraguay  -0.04  -0.01 
Philippines  -0.01  -0.00 
Rest of Africa  0.08  0.02 
Rest of Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.00 
Rest of Eastern Europe  0.00  0.00 
Rest of Latin America  -0.05  0.00 
Rest of South East Asia  3.82  0.35 
Senegal  0.59  0.16 
South Africa  0.02  0.00 
Sri Lanka  0.00  0.00 
Turkey  0.03  0.00 
US  0.02  0.00 





Annex Table 5: Percentage Change in Export Volume in 2020 When OECD Provides 100% DFQF 
 
LDCs 
Sector  Bangla  Ethiopia  Madag  Malawi  Mozamb  RoSEA  Senegal 
Agrofood  1.99  5.79  0.03  14.16  4.12  -3.54  6.47 
Industry  5.01  -3.11  -0.06  -8.46  -0.64  3.33  -1.05 
Animal and meatproducts  -5.58  -3.03  0.16  -28.10  -4.03  -6.20  -4.24 
Beverage and tobacco  -2.01  3.90  0.04  -4.55  -0.32  -1.88  -0.32 
Chemicalrubber plastic 
products  -3.95  -1.56  0.02  -11.33  4.95  -4.37  -1.27 
Coal oilgas  -5.80  -0.01  -0.02  -5.38  -0.45  -2.05  -0.18 
Cotton woolsilkforestry  -4.34  -0.55  0.11  -24.93  -3.35  -2.42  -1.75 
Fish  -1.92  -0.44  0.00  -7.67  -0.32  2.02  -0.71 
Leatherproducts  -2.47  -4.68  0.26  -19.35  -0.88  -3.98  -0.13 
Metals  -6.64  -3.17  0.06  -14.70  -0.71  -6.34  -1.48 
Milk  812.46  3583.82  -0.13  -18.47  8.40  -5.25  -1.60 
Oilseeds  24.09  12.92  -0.31  -18.77  14.92  -2.66  -1.49 
Othercereal grains  -1.27  2.13  0.08  -15.51  3.17  -2.09  -2.24 
Othercrops  33.98  -2.63  -1.09  63.41  31.55  -3.64  -2.06 
Otherfoodproducts  -2.34  11.55  0.09  -10.05  -0.16  -3.56  -0.64 
Othermanufacturedproducts  -5.17  -2.72  0.04  -13.60  -0.37  -3.50  -0.76 
Otherminerals  -1.26  -0.75  0.01  -4.59  -0.10  -1.02  -0.30 
Other services  -3.60  -1.78  0.04  -12.38  -0.48  -3.62  -1.06 
Rice  50.16  -1.24  0.47  -15.12  -1.19  -4.54  -0.56 
Services  -3.64  -1.65  0.03  -10.18  -0.44  -3.44  -0.98 
Sugar  -3.16  0.20  0.67  -11.63  -1.13  -3.83  -2.43 
Textile  5.52  0.82  -0.32  -21.07  -1.81  16.13  -1.50 
Trade  -4.16  -1.77  0.01  -12.04  -0.31  -4.08  -0.93 
Transport  -4.17  -1.45  0.02  -8.76  -0.34  -3.04  -0.80 
Vegetable and fruit  71.00  -1.48  0.17  -18.87  -1.22  -2.84  -1.57 
Vegetableoils and fats  -2.47  -11.43  -0.60  -18.91  1.06  -5.34  102.21 
Wearingapparel  8.17  -2.53  0.04  -18.11  0.65  19.49  -1.64 
Wheat  -3.39  -4.23  0.00  -21.46  0.00  -1.37  0.00 
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Lanka  Vietnam 
Agrofood  -0.12  -0.26  -0.23  0.16  0.12  -0.09  -0.09  -0.55  1.18  -0.18  0.00  -0.23  0.08  -0.01  -0.07 
Industry  0.03  0.32  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.06  0.06  0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.00  0.05  0.01  -0.01  0.00 
Animal, meatproducts  0.04  -0.19  0.02  -0.54  -0.04  0.16  0.25  0.11  0.83  0.27  -0.14  0.14  0.11  0.04  -0.07 
Beverages, tobacco  0.02  -0.09  0.51  -0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.02  -0.08  0.20  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.17 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products  0.05  -0.22  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.09  -0.09  0.00  -0.01  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.20 
Coal, oil, gas  0.06  -0.01  -0.19  -0.03  0.00  -0.05  0.12  -0.12  0.04  -0.09  -0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.00 
Cotton, wool, silk, forestry  -0.01  0.03  0.12  -0.20  0.50  0.60  0.08  0.09  -0.52  -0.03  0.35  0.25  0.09  0.08  -0.05 
Fish  0.05  -0.09  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.10  -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  -0.03  0.03  0.08 
Leatherproducts  0.11  -0.30  0.03  -0.04  0.03  0.05  0.10  0.01  -0.25  0.13  0.01  0.14  -0.03  0.03  -0.01 
Metals  0.11  -0.35  0.04  -0.03  0.02  -0.03  0.07  -0.01  -0.13  -0.01  0.01  0.11  -0.07  0.04  0.10 
Milk  -0.04  -0.21  0.14  0.10  0.29  -0.10  -0.02  -0.02  0.19  0.12  -0.04  0.02  0.23  -0.04  0.22 
Oilseeds  -1.78  -1.31  -0.72  -0.33  0.99  -18.84  -0.15  -3.09  96.04  -0.68  -0.78  -0.01  1.81  -0.77  -2.87 
Othercereal grains  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.28  0.03  0.10  0.06  0.13  -0.15  0.56  0.08  0.14  0.28  0.04  0.26 
Othercrops  -0.21  -1.12  -0.52  -0.41  -0.01  -0.12  -0.20  -0.40  -0.26  -0.16  -0.32  -1.11  0.03  0.05  -0.17 
Otherfoodproducts  0.06  -0.15  -0.02  -0.06  0.00  -0.08  -0.01  -0.05  -0.10  0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.05  -0.05  -0.15 
Othermfd.products  0.04  -0.22  0.06  -0.05  -0.01  0.04  0.05  0.02  -0.07  -0.01  0.00  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.00 
Otherminerals  -0.01  -0.07  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.00  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.01 
Other services  0.07  -0.18  0.04  -0.03  0.00  0.04  0.06  0.03  -0.09  0.00  0.00  0.08  -0.03  0.02  0.01 
Rice  0.01  0.05  0.17  -0.27  0.14  0.12  0.03  0.17  0.37  0.06  0.06  0.12  0.19  0.10  0.13 
Services  0.07  -0.17  0.04  -0.02  0.00  0.03  0.06  0.03  -0.08  0.00  0.00  0.08  -0.03  0.02  0.01 
Sugar  -0.07  -0.23  -0.28  0.27  0.32  0.23  0.27  -0.43  0.31  0.15  0.09  0.30  -0.13  0.37  -0.17 
Textile  -0.40  4.29  0.04  0.05  0.08  -0.12  0.01  -0.20  -0.25  0.33  0.02  -0.21  -0.07  -0.16  -0.08 
Trade  0.06  -0.20  0.04  -0.03  -0.01  0.03  0.05  0.03  -0.09  -0.01  -0.01  0.07  -0.05  0.01  -0.01 
Transport  0.07  -0.14  0.04  -0.01  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.02  -0.07  0.00  0.00  0.07  -0.03  0.02  0.00 
Vegetable, fruit  0.07  -0.03  0.17  -0.20  0.07  0.25  0.08  0.26  -0.45  0.02  0.00  0.08  0.07  0.13  0.09 
Vegetableoils, fats  -0.02  -0.64  -0.43  2.18  -0.15  -0.46  -0.24  -3.75  -2.05  -0.99  -0.77  -1.13  0.48  -0.14  0.43 
Wearingapparel  -0.13  0.60  -0.02  -0.07  0.21  0.01  0.06  -0.08  -0.24  1.04  0.06  -0.01  0.06  -0.03  -0.13 
Wheat  0.00  0.04  0.17  0.00  0.23  0.99  0.08  0.28  -0.51  0.05  0.06  0.15  0.23  0.07  0.07 
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